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Cookies are randomly generated strings of numbers and letters that can be sent from a website 
to a user’s browser, where they are stored in a subdirectory on the computer for the length 
of a session and returned unchanged to the website; their role is to identify and remember 
the computer and thus provide continuity between visits to and transactions on that site. The 
HTTP cookie was initially developed by Netscape in 1994 to authenticate the account with 
which the website was dealing and to record a browsing history. Because it introduces memory, 
or statefulness, into a stateless system such as the basic internet protocols, which retain no 
memory of previous interactions, it can recall those interactions through the assignment of a 
unique visitor ID. That makes it possible to construct a shopping cart of items, for example, 
or to fill in an online form, rather than having to start anew with each item, or to remember 
login details and preferences, or to resume interaction on a site on a user’s subsequent visit, or 
to collect information about their buying habits. By recording and retrieving state information 
(information about a set of conditions at a moment in time), cookies are, we might say, 
deictically charged: localised in time and space to a particular Internet subject.
On most browsers, tracking cookies can be disabled or deleted by users in order to defend 
their privacy. That privacy—that store of detailed personal information—is, however, the 
primary commodity on the web for information brokers and the advertisers who buy from 
them. In response to the threat of deletion, in 2005 an American advertising company 
rejoicing in the name United Virtualities developed a backup system for cookies known as 
Flash cookies, which, like HTTP or tracking cookies, render a browsing activity stateful.1 
Flash cookies are tracking devices within the ‘local shared objects’ area of Adobe Flash, which 
is installed on almost all computers, and its key features are that it is persistent (it doesn’t have 
an expiration date) and that it is a zombie cookie, with the ability to recreate or ‘respawn’ a 
deleted tracking cookie using data stored in Flash. It is hard to eradicate, it is set not to ask 
the user’s permission to store data, and it is used to collate ‘ostensibly nonpersonal behavioral 
information in order to produce a closely approximate demographic portrait including age, 
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gender, location, educational level, income, consumption habits (purchasing and reading), 
sexual preference, and health issues’.2
A range of other tracking devices supplement the work of local shared objects or Flash 
cookies. On mobile phones, where cookies are relatively inefficient because they must be reset 
when a browser is closed and they can’t be shared between apps or devices, they have a more 
limited existence. A range of alternative methods of tracking are currently being developed, 
including Client/Device Generated Identifier, Statistical ID, HTML5 Cookie Tracking, and 
Universal Login Tracking. On computer web browsers, third party cookies which are placed 
on a user’s computer by a web site with a domain name other than the one being visited—in 
banner ads displayed on a website, for example—enable tracking of users across websites, and 
the cross-synchronisation or cookie-matching of different identifiers assigned to users allows 
the creation of a unified identifier which can then potentially be correlated with an offline 
identity, or rather, with the datasets assigned to it.3 
Even harder to detect than Flash cookies, web beacons (also known as web bugs, pixel 
tags or clear gifs) were originally single-pixel .gif tags in a web document or an email, often 
of the same colour as the background and so completely invisible; opening the page or email 
triggers a request from the computer to the remote server, thus sending identifying and 
tracking information about the computer. Later versions of the web beacon use other pictorial 
or non-pictorial elements such as banners or buttons, or the HTML frame, which may be 
independent of the framed content—an advertisement, for example—and sends identifying 
information to the third-party server that owns it. Beacons can thus ‘track user interaction on 
the page, including typed entries and mouse movements’, and use this information to follow 
movements across the Internet. They ‘may also be used to retrieve files stored on a hard drive, 
record conversations through a computer microphone, or transmit images from a computer’s 
video camera’,4 as well as collecting a range of personal information and sending it on to 
advertising profilers.
The collection processes employed by cookies and cognate devices are structurally 
homologous with those of state intelligence services. What Shoshana Zuboff calls ‘online 
surveillance at scale’5 harvests information that had never previously been captured—‘about 
people’s time-space paths through the course of the day, the details of when and where they 
chat with friends, even the random queries that drift through their minds (to the extent that 
these are transformed into Google searches)’6—and it does so by making use of algorithmic 
procedures, such as mathematical association rules, which moved from the commercial 
sphere where they were initially developed to that of national security apparatuses.7 But the 
ubiquity of commercial and state surveillance doesn’t mean that we live in a world of totalised 
panoptic control. Mark Andrejevic has suggested the alternative metaphor of a world made up 
of a series of distinct but sometimes overlapping digital enclosures, meaning the coverage 
range created by the interactive and data storage capabilities of any digital surveillance 
technology: a world characterised, then, ‘by a proliferation of different monitoring networks 
with varying capabilities for information capture under the control of different entities’.8 
Under certain conditions (a totalitarian government with a  tight hand on the public domain, 
for example) data from a number of different enclosures might be aggregated; and security 
agencies such as the NSA do in practice make use of commercially gathered data, either by 
stealing it or by exploiting software vulnerabilities or merely by requesting access to it. This is 
an area in which the tech companies are pushing back, but probably the most we can say about 
this is that the balance between privacy and security is precarious and in a state of considerable 
flux. Further, the coexistence of digital enclosures within an overarching assemblage means 
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that information collected for commercial purposes might be migrated ‘across a range of 
other, sometimes unanticipated functions’. 9 The trade goes both ways, with technologies and 
software developed for military or security purposes finding their way into the surveillance 
activities of business—or, more precisely perhaps, with an increasing lack of differentiation 
between these spheres. 
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